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In science fiction stories, such as Star Wars and The Jetsons, humans are surrounded by sophisticated 
AIs, but they remain unenhanced. The historian Michael Bess says these stories fall prey to a 
“Jetsons Fallacy”—they assume that the brain will remain the same, merely being subject to the 
relatively slow pace of Darwinian evolution. More realistically however, AI will not just change the 
world, it will likely transform the brain’s cognitive and perceptual abilities as well.1  
Consider that if we use AI technologies to transform the mind, then it will be intelligently designed. But 
we, not a god, will be the designers. So if we are to embark upon this path, we had better think it 
through (Schneider 2019a). The suggestion that humans should eventually merge with AI is 
currently discussed by researchers and the media as both as a way for humans to avoid AI-based 
technological unemployment and as a path to radical longevity and superintelligence. For example, 
Elon Musk recently remarked that humans can avoid being outmoded by AI by “having some sort 
of merger of biological intelligence and machine intelligence.”2 Further, he’s founded a new 
company, Neuralink, which aims to connect the brain directly to computers. In addition, there are 
already many projects developing brain-implant technologies to treat mental illness, motion-based 
impairments, strokes, dementia, autism, and more. We are not suggesting that AI-based brain 
enhancements will become commonplace during the 2020’s, but things may very well be moving in 
that direction, and the medical treatments of today will likely give rise to the enhancements of 
tomorrow.3In this chapter, we hope to clarify some of the philosophical issues at stake and suggest a 
sensible path forward. We illustrate that merging oneself with AI could lead to perverse realizations 
of AI technology, such as the demise of the person who sought enhancement. And, in a positive 
 
1 Michael Bess, Our Grandchildren Redesigned (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2015).  
2 Olivia Solon, “Elon Musk Says Humans Must Become Cyborgs to Stay Relevant. Is He Right?,” The Guardian (February 
15, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/feb/15/elon-musk- cyborgs-robots-artificial-intelligence-is-
he-right.  
3 Susan Schneider, Artificial You: AI and the Future of Your Mind (S.l.: Princeton University Press, 2019).  
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vein, we offer ways to avoid this, at least within the context of one theory of the nature of 
personhood.  
Here’s how we will proceed. First, we provide background about the so-called “technological 
singularity” (first section) and outline some methods of cognitive and perceptual enhancement 
(second section). Then, in the third and fourth sections, we discuss several concerns about cognitive 
and perceptual enhancement. We then focus on the personal identity issue in more detail, offering a 
few practical suggestions in the fifth section, including certain ethical guidelines for the use of brain 
enhancement devices and taking a stance of “metaphysical humility” toward the metaphysics of 
personhood. In the sixth section, we then consider different ways external cognitive artifacts might 
augment personhood on the psychological theory of identity, comparing and contrasting the 
psychological continuity version of the theory with the narrative version. We conclude that while 
many external artifacts, such as lifelogs, can bolster psychological continuity, it is unclear whether 
this is the case with respect to narrative continuity. Finally, in the seventh section, we question 
whether more radical forms of enhancement, such as chips in the brain, could be constructed so as 
to maintain psychological continuity or narrative structure. We contend that while chips may be able 
to accomplish these tasks, these more invasive forms of enhancement raise philosophical 
complications that milder forms of enhancement lack (e.g., reduplication worries, the consciousness 
problem, and authenticity concerns), and we provisionally recommend on this basis that certain 
invasive, (“substrate replacing”) enhancements be avoided in favor of biological enhancements.  
I. The Technological Singularity 
The development of AI has been driven by market forces and government and military strategic 
investments. Billions of dollars are pouring into constructing smart household assistants, robot 
supersoldiers, and supercomputers (Schneider 2019a). For example, the Japanese government has 
launched an initiative to have androids take care of the nation’s elderly, in anticipation of a labor 
shortage. Further, AI is projected to outmode many human professions within the next several 
decades. According to a recent survey, the most-cited AI researchers expect AI to “carry out most 
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human professions at least as well as a typical human” within a 50 percent probability by 2050, and 
within a 90 percent probability by 2070.4 
Given these market forces, and the strategic needs of various countries to stay abreast of the latest 
AI technologies, AI may soon advance to artificial general intelligence (AGI) within the next several 
decades. AGI is human-level intelligence that can com- bine insights from different topic areas and 
display flexibility and common sense reasoning. (Some take AGI to be the sort of system that 
processes information just like humans do, but the expression “AGI” should be understood more 
generally. What is essential is that the AI functions at least as well as humans in all or at least a key 
range of tasks, not that it achieve this by being precisely reverse-engineered from the brain.)  
Superintelligent AI is a hypothetical form of AI that surpasses us in all domains: scientific reasoning, 
social intelligence, and more.5 Ray Kurzweil, a transhumanist who is now a director of engineering at 
Google, writes vividly of a technological utopia in which benevolent superintelligence brings about 
the end of aging, disease, poverty, and resource scarcity.6 However, even if one grants that AGI and 
superintelligence could be developed, this utopian scenario has been questioned by those posing the 
control probllem—the problem of how humans can control a superintelligent system, given that the 
system is smarter than humans in all domains. The concern is that such a system may have goals that 
run contrary to human flourishing and that a superintelligence could lead to human extinction.7  
Whether AI turns out to threaten the very existence of humanity or not, Kurzweil and other 
transhumanists contend that we are fast approaching a “technological singularity”: a hypothetical 
point at which AI far surpasses human intelligence and can solve all sorts of problems we weren’t 
able to solve before. The singularity, they stress, features unpredictable consequences for civilization 
and human nature. The idea of a singularity comes from the concept of a black hole, a “singular” 
object in space and time, and a place where normal laws of physics break down. In a similar vein, the 
 
4 Vincent C. Müller, and Nick Bostrom, “Future Progress in Artificial Intelligence: A Survey of Expert Opinion,” 
Fundamental Issues of Artificial Intelligence (2016): 555–572.  
5 Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
6 Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology (New York, NY: Viking, 2006).  
7 Bostrom, Superintelligence, 2014.  
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technological singularity is supposed to generate runaway technological growth and massive 
alterations to civilization and the human mind.8 
It is important to stress that human technological innovations may not be so rapid that they lead to a 
full-fledged singularity in which the world changes overnight. But the larger point still holds: as we 
move further into the twenty-first century, unenhanced humans may not be the most intelligent 
beings on the planet for that much longer. The greatest intelligences on the planet may be synthetic.  
II. Cognitive and Perceptual Enhancement: Some Background 
Cognitive and perceptual enhancements amplify or extend one’s cognitive or perceptual capacities 
through improvement or augmentation of one’s information processing systems, including sensory 
systems. Whereas therapies intervene to correct a problem with a cognitive or perceptual 
system/subsystem, enhancements, by contrast, intervene to improve a cognitive or perceptual 
ability, and perhaps even provide a new capacity.9 
There are many kinds of cognitive and perceptual enhancement technologies that could be utilized 
in the future, ranging from the ordinary to the science fiction-like. Different methods of 
enhancement can be summarized as follows:  
1. Brain implants involving AI technologies. Currently, brain chips are primarily being developed 
for therapeutic (as opposed to enhancement) purposes. Theodore Berger’s lab at the University of 
Southern California, for example, is developing an artificial hippocampus that could allow 
individuals with severe memory impairment to formulate new memories. Researchers are currently 
at work creating brain chips for other impairments as well, such as depression, post-traumatic stress 
disorder, and Alzheimer’s disease. As neural prosthetic technology develops, it is likely that such 
technologies will be used for enhancement as well. People will wish to enhance their reasoning 
capacities, memory, and attention well beyond what is considered to be biologically normal.  
2. Pharmaceutical drugs. While most pharmaceutical drugs are currently developed for therapeutic 
purposes (e.g., to treat ADHD), this will not in all likelihood remain the case. Certain pharmaceutical 
 
8 Vernor Vinge, “The Coming Technological Singularity: How to Survive in the Post-human Era,” Whole Earth Review, 
1993.  
9 The distinction between a therapy and an enhancement is controversial, and some reject it altogether, claiming that it is 
often difficult to discern whether a case is a therapy or an enhancement (see Bostrom & Roache, 2007).  
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drugs are currently being used off label for enhancement purposes, such as metformin, for life 
extension and Adderall, for attentional enhancement. In the future, more and more drugs may be 
produced to enhance the brains and bodies of normal individuals.  
3. External cognitive artifacts. These are extra-cranial devices that function to enhance human 
cognition. This includes numerous different technologies, such as the internet, navigation systems, 
cell phones, diaries, and brain-computer interface devices.  
4. Biological enhancements. Biological enhancements can involve the use of biotechnology, 
including nanotechnology and genetics, to extend the lifespan of the bio- logical brain or to augment 
certain parts of the brain, or alter genes of subsequent generations so parents can produce smarter 
offspring.  
5. Conventional enhancements (e.g., education and psychological interventions). The term 
“enhancement” could be used broadly, including mental strategies that enhance core mental 
capacities. Bostrom and Sandberg observe: “The spectrum of cognitive enhancements includes not 
only medical interventions, but also psychological interventions (such as learned ‘tricks’ or mental 
strategies), as well as improvements of external technological and institutional structures that 
support cognition.”10 
6. Mind-uploading. A hypothetical, (and highly speculative) type of enhancement that is discussed 
by transhumanists, which involves the migration of a mind from a brain to a computer. Proponents 
of this procedure believe that the mind can be implemented onto different substrate, just as 
computer software programs can be implemented onto different hardware. The ultimate goal behind 
mind-uploading is to either to allow the mind to live in a virtual reality world or reside in a computer 
that operates inside (or connected to) a humanoid robot or a biological body.11 
It is important to bear in mind that no one can accurately predict the future of brain enhancement 
technologies, although it is perhaps possible to make some reasonable approximations from looking 
at present trends and research. We are not suggesting that human brain-uploading will be developed, 
or even that those wishing for brain enhancements will do so through invasive AI-based techniques, 
 
10 Bostrom and Sandberg, “Cognitive Enhancement: Methods, Ethics, Regulatory Challenges” (2009), 312.  
11 David J. Chalmers, “The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (2010): 9–10.  
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rather than biological or genetic enhancements or noninvasive AI-based technologies. Bearing in 
mind these qualifications, in what follows, we focus on more radical and hypothetical forms of AI-
based brain enhancement that may arise in or around a singularity, if such indeed occurs.  
Suppose it is 2045, and you stroll into a new medical enhancement center called “The Center for 
Mind Design.” There customers can choose from a variety of brain enhancements. Human 
Calculator can provide you with savant-level mathematical abilities; Zen Garden can give you the 
meditative states of a Zen master, and so on. It is also rumored that if clinical trials go as planned, 
customers may soon be able to purchase an enhancement bundle called “Merge”: a series of brain 
enhancements allowing customers to gradually augment and transfer all of their mental functions to 
the cloud over a period of five years.12 Should you add one or more chips to your brain, and even try 
Merge? In the following we discuss some considerations that are relevant to your decision.  
III. Concerns 
Even assuming these enhancements are medically safe, it doesn’t follow that they are beneficial to an 
individual or society. For instance, enhancements may only be available for the wealthiest members 
of society, creating a rich-poor intellectual gap, or perhaps, in the vein of a science fiction dystopia, 
socially mandated microchips become the norm, so that schools, governments, or employers require 
certain enhancements, and even use them to mine data and track people. These scenarios raise the 
concern that enhancements will dehumanize us. Indeed, authors in the cyberpunk genre of science 
fiction depict technological dystopias in which individuals lose control of their enhancements—
governments or corporations hack their thoughts, cut off their access to their implants, and threaten 
their very survival.13 This is clearly dehumanizing, and it is not hard to foresee that such technologies 
could lead to abuse in the hands of an authoritarian dictatorship or unregulated capitalist economy. 
In a different vein, one might worry that even if such scenarios are avoided, radical brain 
enhancements would rob us of our humanity because our very limitations and vulnerabilities are part 
of what makes us human in the first place. Such limitations and vulnerabilities might, for instance, 
preserve certain traits that ought to be preserved, like humility.14 Relatedly, Daniel Callahan, a so-
 
12 Schneider, Artificial You.  
13 William, Gibson. Neuromancer (New York: Ace Books, 1984).  
14 Kevin Fitzgerald, S.J., “Medical Enhancement: A Destination of Technological, Not Human,  Betterment,” Medical 
Enhancement and Posthumanity: The International Library of Ethics, Law and Technology (2008): 39–53.  
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called “life cycle traditionalist,” criticizes any attempts to extend the human lifespan or control the 
aging process via enhancement.15 This “traditionalist” attitude is antithetical to the aspirations of 
transhumanists, such as the biological gerontologist Aubrey de Grey, who views aging as a disease 
that we may be able to overcome in our lifetime with advances in medical technology.16 
Transhumanists, like Nick Bostrom, Anders Sandberg, James Hughes and Aubrey de Grey, claim 
that the human species is now in a comparatively early phase and that its very evolution will be 
altered by developing technologies. Future humans will have radically advanced intelligence, extreme 
longevity, deep friendships with AI creatures, and elective body and mental characteristics. 
Transhumanists share the belief that such an outcome is very desirable, both from the vantage point 
of one’s own personal development and for the development of our species as a whole.17 
Perhaps some, like Callahan, would not wish for longevity or advanced intelligence, but 
transhumanists have always stressed that enhancements should be optional, and stressing the import 
of human flourishing, they would clearly view cyberpunk dystopias as undesirable.  
Schneider agrees with many of the transhumanist aims but has doubts about whether the radical AI-
based enhancements they advocate will accomplish the transhumanists goals of longevity, human 
flourishing, and intelligence enhancement. Her concern is that even if the technologies are medically 
safe and are not used as tools by surveillance capitalism or an authoritarian dictatorship, these 
enhancements may still fail to do their job for philosophical reasons. In what follows, we explore 
one such concern, a problem that involves the nature of the self.  
IV. Personal Identity and Radical Enhancement 
Imagine that, longing for superintelligence, you consider buying Merge at the Center for Mind 
Design. Should you do it? To understand whether you should embark upon this journey, you must 
first understand what and who you are. But what is a self or person? What allows a self to continue 
existing over time? Like consciousness, the nature of the self is a matter of intense philosophical 
controversy. And given your conception of a self or person, would you continue to exist after 
 
15 D. Callahan, “Aging and the Life Cycle: A Moral Norm?,” A World Growing Old: The Coming Health Care Challenges 
(Washington: Georgetown University Press 1995), 21–27.  
16 Aubrey de Grey, Ending Aging: the Rejuvenation Breakthroughs That Could Reverse Human Aging in Our Lifetime (St. Martin’s 
Griffin, 2008).  
17 The basic tenets of Transhumanism were first formally put forth by the World Transhumanist Association in the 
Transhumanist Declaration in 1998.  
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adding Merge—or would you have ceased to exist, having been replaced by someone else? If the 
latter, why should you try Merge in the first place?  
Even if your hypothetical merger with AI brings benefits like superhuman intelligence and radical 
life extension, it must not involve the elimination of any of what philosophers call “essential 
properties”—the things that make you.18 Even if you would like to become superintelligent, 
knowingly trading away one or more of your essential properties would be tantamount to suicide—
that is, to your intentionally causing yourself to cease to exist. So before you attempt to redesign 
your mind, you’d better know what your essential properties are.  
So what are your essential properties? Unfortunately, there is intense disagreement on the matter. 
One can distinguish between at least four influential approaches to personal identity in the 
metaphysics literature:  
Brain-based materialism: You are essentially the material that you are made out of (i.e., your body 
and brain).19                                                                                                                           
Dualist theories: Views that explain personal identity in terms of the persistence of an immaterial 
or nonphysical substance (such as a soul or Cartesian ego).20                                                       
Psychological theories: Views that explain personal identity in terms of psycho- logical properties, 
such as experiences, beliefs, memories, and so forth.21                                                                                        
The No Self View: The self is an illusion. The “I” is a grammatical fiction (Nietzsche). There are 
bundles of impressions, but there is no underlying self (Hume). There is no survival because there is 
no person (Buddha).22 
Each of these positions has its own implications about whether to enhance the brain. For example, 
suppose you are partial to the soul theory. In this case, your decision to enhance would seem to 
depend on whether you have justification for believing that your enhanced brain and body would 
retain your soul or immaterial mind.  
 
18 Joseph Corabi and Susan Schneider, “Metaphysics of Uploading,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (2012): 26  
19 J.J. Thomson, “People and Their Bodies,” Reading Parfit (ed. J. Dancy, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997).  
20 R.G. Swinburne, “Personal identity,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 (1973): 231–247.  
21 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (ed. P.H. Nidditch, 4th ed., Oxford:  
Clarendon Press, 1975).  
22 For a transhumanist approach, see Hughes, James, “Humanism for Personhood: Against Human-Racism,” Free Inquiry 
24 (2004).  
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Many philosophers sympathize with the “psychological continuity view,” which is one type of 
psychological theory. We will discuss psychological theories in more detail shortly. But for now, the 
psychological continuity view says that the holding of a certain psychological relation is necessary or 
sufficient, or both, for an individual to persist over time—you survive by inheriting mental features 
such as memories, beliefs, personality dispositions and so on.23 But this means that if we change our 
memories or personality in radical ways by enhancing the brain, the continuity could be broken.  
Alternately, consider brain-based materialism. Within the fields of philosophy of mind and 
metaphysics, views that are materialist claim that minds are basically physical or material in nature 
and that mental features, such as the thought that Bach is a famous composer, are ultimately just 
physical features. (This position is often called “physical- ism” as well.) Brain-based materialism says 
this, and, in addition, it makes the additional claim that your thinking is dependent on the brain. 
Thought doesn’t “transfer” to a different substrate. So on this view, enhancements should not 
change one’s material substrate, or the person would cease to exist. So enhancements like Merge are 
unsafe, because you are replacing parts of your brain with AI components.  
Advocates of a mind-machine merger tend to reject the view that the mind is the brain, however. 
They believe that the mind is like a software program: just as you can upload and download a 
computer file, your mind can add new lines of code and even be uploaded onto the cloud. 
According to this view, the underlying substrate that runs your “self-program” doesn’t really 
matter—it could be a biological brain or a silicon computer.  
However, we believe that this computationalist view of the mind doesn’t hold up under scrutiny. A 
program is a list of instructions in a programming language that tell the computer what tasks to do, 
and a line of code is like a mathematical equation. It is highly abstract, in contrast with the concrete 
physical world. Equations and programs are what philosophers call “abstract entities”—things not 
situated in space or time. But minds and selves are spatial beings and causal agents; our minds have 
thoughts that cause us to act in the concrete world. And moments pass for us—we are temporal 
beings. 
 
23 D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).  
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Perhaps you are inclined to the No Self View. In this case, survival isn’t an issue for you, and you 
can make enhancement decisions solely based on other considerations, such as maximizing the 
happiness of future sentient beings and minimizing suffering.  
So, how can we approach the issue, given all this philosophical disagreement? Would you survive 
Zen Garden? Merge? You might feel inclined to passionately defend a certain theory of personal 
identity if you chat with your friends, colleagues or students about these issues, but would you put 
your money where your mouth is?  
V. Three Suggestions 
We have three suggestions.  
1. In Making Radical Brain Enhancement Decisions, Distinguish the Issue of Personal Identity, or Survival over 
Time, from that of Consciousness  
Notice that the question of whether or not your identity survives cognitive enhancement—whether 
that future being is really you—is distinct from the question of whether or not consciousness 
survives. It is currently unclear whether AI can be conscious. If it is, then microchips can, at least in 
principle, be used in areas of the brain responsible for consciousness without one losing 
consciousness or experiencing diminished consciousness. It is possible that attempts at radical 
enhancement, such as mind-uploading or the augmentation of many of one’s mental abilities 
through implantation of AI devices, that consciousness is preserved, but personal identity is not. 
Perhaps the uploaded copy of your mind is conscious, but the copy is still not you.  
Schneider believes it will be easier to tell if AI is conscious than it will be to determine which theory 
of personal identity is true, if any. This is because she suspects we can test whether consciousness 
could have a different substrate. Schneider has devised a test for synthetic consciousness, which she 
calls “the chip test.” The test involves observing whether normal patients having AI components 
placed in their brains (in place of neural tissue, which is removed) experience a loss of consciousness 
after the surgery: “If . . . a prosthetic part of the brain ceases to function normally—specifically, if it 
ceases to give rise to the aspect of consciousness that that brain area is responsible for—then, there 
should be behavioral indications, including verbal reports . . . This would indicate a ‘substitution 
failure’ of the artificial part for the original component. Microchips of that sort just don’t seem to be 
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the right stuff.” Similarly, patients needing prosthetic devices in parts of the brain responsible for 
consciousness to correct a problem due to brain injury or disease may experience a restoration of 
elements of their conscious experience. Like the episodes Oliver Sacks wrote about, patients can 
report changes to their consciousness, and they can be carefully tested by researchers to mark 
alterations in conscious brain processing.  
In contrast, it is difficult to envision testing different theories of personal identity. After all, we 
cannot expect behavioral differences between a person and her conscious upload, molecular 
duplicate, functional isomorph, and so on. Such will likely believe they are the same person they 
were before, as they have all the same memories and behavioral traits. Instead, we have to rely on 
armchair philosophical considerations to adjudicate between competing theories. But the problem of 
personal identity has been intensely debated by philosophers for centuries, and it has proven to be 
vexing, as we have seen, and there is intense disagreement over the different solutions. In light of 
this we suggest the following approach.  
2. A Stance of Metaphysical Humility  
In Artificial You, Schneider opts for a stance of “metaphysical humility” in the face of radical brain 
enhancements. Given the controversies over personal identity, claims about survival that involve 
one “transferring” one’s mind to a new type of substrate or making drastic alterations to one’s brain 
must be carefully scrutinized. As alluring as greatly enhanced intelligence or digital immortality may 
be, there is simply too much disagreement in the personal-identity literature over whether any of 
these “enhancements” would extend life or terminate it.  
All this uncertainty suggests that one should take the transhumanist approach to radical 
enhancement with a grain of salt. Enhancements like brain-uploading or adding brain chips to 
augment intelligence or one’s perceptual abilities are key enhancements invoked by the 
transhumanists, yet these enhancements sound strangely like the thought experiments philosophers 
have used for years as problem cases for various theories of the nature of persons. In light of this, it 
isn’t surprising to us that the enhancements aren’t as attractive as they might seem at first. 
The way forward is public dialogue, informed by metaphysical theorizing as well as a technical 
understanding of AI/neurotechnologies. This may sound like a sort of intellectual cop-out, like we 
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are throwing our hands up in the face of ignorance, but we are not saying that further metaphysical 
theorizing is useless. To the contrary, we believe the first step is to underscore the life-and-death 
import of further metaphysical reflection on these issues: ordinary individuals must be capable of 
making informed decisions about enhancement. If the success of an enhancement rests on (inter 
alia) classic philosophical issues that are difficult to solve, the public needs to realize this, and not 
assume that researchers, members of the media or business leaders who are enthused by the bells 
and whistles of a new technology are also experts on philosophical questions of whether one should 
enhance.  
3. Support Regulations of Brain Enhancement Devices that Require that Consumers Be Informed about the Personal 
Identity Debate  
Bearing this in mind, brain-enhancement devices should be regulated by a government agency, such 
as the Food and Drug Administration in the United States, and disclosure of the personal identity 
controversy should be required, just as medical risks for pharmaceutical drugs are required to be 
disclosed. Consider, for instance, that patients routinely grapple with ethical issues when they 
consider whether to undergo genetic testing, asking themselves whether they or a loved one would 
really want to know if they were going to have a high probability of getting a certain horrible illness, 
what to do if life insurance companies get hold of their data, and so on. For this reason, it is 
protocol at many medical centers in the United States that patients considering genetic testing be 
required to meet with a genetics counselor or nurse who discusses the pros and cons of testing 
before testing and then return and meet with the counselor to discuss the test results. In the context 
of brain-enhancement devices, we believe a similar approach could be taken.  
We have further suggestions as well. But for now, let’s assume that you are inclined to resist our 
suggestion of metaphysical humility: in particular, you are strongly persuaded by the psychological 
view. If so, we have further suggestions for you  
VI. A Way Forward? The Psychological Continuity and Narrative Views  
Suppose that, in addition to being impressed by the psychological view, you’ve just learned that 
individuals using AI-based enhancements are doing so without a loss of conscious experience. On 
the assumption that a certain version of the psychological view obtains, perhaps certain kinds of 
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brain enhancements could enhance psychological continuity, reducing the likelihood that numerical 
identity would not obtain after the enhancement.  
To see what we have in mind, we will need to distinguish different versions of the psychological 
theory. There are two main versions: psychological continuity views and narrative views. We’ve 
already introduced continuity views, in broad strokes. Psychological continuity views differ with 
respect to which direct connection is the most important in terms of constituting personal identity. 
While all psychological continuity theorists believe that the connection of memory is necessary for 
personal identity, some go so far as to claim that memory is the only relevant psychological 
connection when it comes to personal identity.  
Psychological continuity views of identity can be contrasted with narrative views. Narrative views 
concur that the relationship of psychological connectedness is necessary for personal identity but 
deny that it is sufficient. Proponents of a narrative view hold that personal identity additionally 
requires the relationship of narrative connectedness. Two of the most prominent defenders of the 
narrative view are Marya Schechtman and Anthony Rudd. Both Schechtman and Rudd hold that 
narrative connectedness exists when one is equipped with an integrative story about themselves 
which details the chronology of their lives and highlights the most important memories/time slices 
contained within that chronology. Rudd analogizes this “integrative story” to a Cartesian ego. The 
idea is not that narratives are metaphysically immaterial entities in the same way that Cartesian egos 
are, but simply that narratives function like Cartesian egos by providing us with a unified sense of 
personhood.24 Schechtman, on the other hand, views the narrative as an extended story which 
transcends the scope of any particular subset of time slices. Schechtman writes: “It is by no means 
obvious that the most essential part of a person’s experience at any time can be reproduced in an 
independent time-slice, even if we imagine that slice containing all of the relevant for- ward- and 
backward-looking elements....[Our experience] is essentially something that takes place over time, 
and whose relevant attributes cannot be caught in a moment or even a series of moments.”25 
The main difference between the narrative theory and the psychological continuity theory is that the 
former views personhood as more active and self-constructed than the latter. Psychological 
 
24 Anthony Rudd, “In Defence of Narrative,” European Journal of Philosophy 17 (2009): 60–75.  
25 Marya Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).  
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continuity theories see personhood as a fundamentally passive phenomenon that is constituted by 
relations of psychological connectedness. Subjects are not responsible for establishing the relevant 
relations of psychological connected- ness through the creation of a narrative. Narrative views, on 
the other hand, claim that subjects are able to actively interpret and construct their own identities by 
choosing which narrative explanation best suits their life.  
Bearing in mind these two versions of the view, we will explore how, should a psychological theory 
be correct, various memory enhancing external cognitive artifacts may function to undermine, 
preserve, or bolster personhood. We begin with the sort of arti- facts around us now, and then apply 
the points we make to the case of radical brain enhancements. There are currently many different 
kinds of external artifacts which function to enhance memory, including the internet, navigation 
systems, cell phones, diaries, and brain-computer interface devices. We will first consider how 
memory enhancing external artifacts may undermine personhood (again, we assume the 
psychological theory of personhood) before suggesting how this may be countered. More 
specifically: we argue that personhood is at a greater risk of being undermined by memory enhancing 
external artifacts on the narrative view than it is on the psychological continuity view. Then, we 
illustrate how a particular memory enhancing external artifact, the visual lifelog, bolsters personhood 
if (a) the memories that are stored in visual lifelogs are nonrepresentational, but (b) the memories 
stored in biological memory are representational.  
Nicolas Carr contends that such artifacts weaken personhood by making us less intellectually 
autonomous: “When we outsource our memory to a machine, we also out- source a very important 
part of our intellect and even our identity.”26 Intellectual autonomy, broadly speaking, is the ability to 
think for oneself and to not be overly reliant on other people and external devices when formulating 
beliefs and engaging in cognition.27 The main way in which memory enhancing external artifacts 
make us less autonomous, according to Carr, is by rendering us less knowledgeable. The internet, in 
 
26 Nicholas G. Carr, The Shallows: What the Internet Is Doing to Our Brains (W.W. Norton, 2011), 9.  
27 See also Michael P. Lynch. The Internet of us: knowing more and understanding less in the age of big data (New York: Liveright 
Publishing Corporation, a division of W.W. Norton & Company, 2016).  
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particular, makes us less knowledgeable by minimizing the amount of information that we need to 
store in biological memory.28 
However, even if Carr is correct, while intellectual autonomy and personhood are related, they do 
not necessarily go hand in hand. More specifically, if the psychological continuity theory is assumed, 
then personhood may be boosted by memory enhancing artifacts, even if Carr is correct that these 
artifacts undermine intellectual autonomy. Recall that personhood, according to the psychological 
continuity view, is explained in terms of psychological connectedness. Memory enhancing external 
artifacts such as the internet and iPhones could strengthen relations of psychological connectedness 
by allowing subjects to unearth memories that would have otherwise been forgotten. Again, this 
holds true despite the fact that the artifacts may simultaneously function to undermine intellectual 
autonomy in various ways. Consider, for example, an Alzheimer’s patient who is gradually losing her 
biological memory. Such a patient might use an external artifact to help her preserve psychological 
continuity. This is indeed the situation depicted in Clark and Chalmers’ fictional case of Otto and 
Inga, which they use not as an example of how personhood can be preserved by enhancements but 
as an argument for the extended mind hypothesis.29 
Further, it isn’t clear that autonomy is really undermined in these cases. This seems to depend on 
deep issues about whether the mind could be extended. To see what we have in mind, consider the 
Alzheimer’s patient case. Is the autonomy of someone who is losing their memories really 
undermined here? In a sense, it seems not, at least in one sense of “autonomy,” as the technology 
preserves their independence. Still, it is correct that the person is not autonomous in another sense, 
as they are now dependent on an external device for cognition. How would we decide whether there 
is an overall loss of autonomy in such cases? It seems that if the external device is an extension of 
the patient’s cognition, then the device arguably makes the patient more autonomous. In that case, 
the person isn’t dependent on an external device because the enhancement is actually part of their 
own cognitive system.  
 
28 Contra Carr, we believe that the internet increases the knowledge at our fingertips, as we can look anything up on the 
web, and we can still remember our results. In any case, Carr’s idea is that we become more reliant on external artifacts 
as these artifacts become increasingly integrated into our cognitive lives. 
29 Andy Clark, and David J. Chalmers, “The Extended Mind,” Analysis 58 (1998): 7–19.  
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In addition to helping subjects unearth memories that would have otherwise been forgotten, 
external artifacts can also give subjects access to digital memories that are more fine-grained than 
those stored in biological memory. Digital memories (like those stored on Facebook) are 
photographic images, and photographic images are arguably more than just mere representations of 
previous perceptions. Kendall Walton (1984) argues for what he calls “photographic realism,” which 
holds that a photographic image of X allows one to indirectly see X itself (as opposed to directly see 
a representation of X): “We really do, literally, see our deceased ancestors when we see photographs of 
them.”30 Walton argues for photographic realism on the basis of providing a conceptual analysis of 
what it means to have “perceptual contact” with the world. If he is correct, then the digital 
memories stored in external artifacts are not mere representations of past perceptions but are rather 
re-presentations or “fixed reflections” of those perceptions. Biological memories, by contrast, are in 
all likelihood representations of previous events. This position is supported by the causal theory of 
memory, which is the default view of memory in contemporary philosophy.31 According to the 
causal theory, remembering requires a causal connection between the original experience 
remembered and the consequent representation of that experience in memory. It is worth pointing 
out, to be fair, that not all theories of memory take memories to be representational by nature. The 
empiricist theory, for example, contends that memories are “preserved sense impressions.”32 Mohan 
Matthen, however, argues against the idea that memories are “preserved content” by emphasizing 
that a single biological memory can occur in a myriad of different formats.33 If it is true that (a) 
digital memories are transparent in the sense advocated by Walton, and (b) biological memories are 
representational, then it is arguably the case that the former kind of memory is more “real” than the 
latter. One could contend, in particular, very much in the vein of Plato’s concept of “mimesis,” that 
representations are always less real than the items represented. Of course, videos can be altered and 
edited, as has been increasingly seen in the so-called “fake news” era. This does not undermine the 
argument that unaltered videos are more transparent than biological memories though. All in all, this 
 
30 Kendall L. Walton, “Transparent Pictures: On the Nature of Photographic Realism,” Noûs 18 (1984): 67–72.  
31 See C.B. Martin, and Max Deutscher, “Remembering,” Philosophical Review 75 (April 1966): 161–196; Sven Bernecker, 
Memory: A Philosophical Study (Oxford University Press, 2010).  
32 David Hume & D.G.C. Macnabb (eds.) A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method 
of Reasoning Into Moral Subjects (Collins, 1739  
33 Mohan Matthen, “Is Memory Preservation?,” Philosophical Studies 148(1) (2010): 3–14.  
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argument serves to lend further support to the hypothesis that external artifacts can bolster 
personhood on the psychological continuity view.  
Things may be different when it comes to the narrative view of identity. The narrative view, to 
reiterate, explains personhood primarily in terms of narrative connectedness. While intellectual 
autonomy is conceptually distinct from psychological connected- ness, it may not be fully 
conceptually distinct from narrative connectedness. This is because narrative connectedness requires 
active cognitive interpretation and construction on the part of the subject. Or, to put it differently, 
narrative connectedness appears to involve the execution of intellectually autonomous acts. It stands 
to reason, then, that by undermining intellectual autonomy, certain memory enhancing external 
artifacts may also undermine personhood on the narrative view.  
Here, it is helpful to consider a particular memory enhancing external artifact: life- logs. Lifelogs are 
devices that record one’s personal experiences from the first-person point of view. There are various 
different kinds of such devices: “A key example is SenseCam, a small wide-angle camera worn 
around one’s neck, taking a picture with a certain interval or when its sensor detects some 
environmental change. These pictures are then edited into a visual lifelong with certain narrative 
structure, transforming, aiding, and in some cases constituting one’s autobiographical narrative.”34 
Lifelogs are unique in that they serve as external aids to both biological memory and narrative 
structure. In other words, lifelogs develop a narrative explanation of one’s memories for the subject. 
Certain social media sites, such as Facebook, already accomplish this task to some extent by 
integrating one’s pictures together to form a story. The increasing integration of lifelogs and related 
technologies into our lives may lead subjects to become more dependent on artifacts for their 
personal narratives, for better or worse. After all, if artifacts are crafting narrative explanations for 
subjects, then there may be less of a need, or at least less motivation, for subjects to craft their own 
narrative explanations. In this case, narrative explanations would become biographical as opposed to 
autobiographical.  
 
34 Richard Heersmink, “Distributed Selves: Personal Identity and Extended Memory Systems,” Synthese 194, no. 8 (2017): 
3136.  
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The partial offloading of narrative structure to external devices certainly undercuts intellectual 
autonomy; the question is whether it undercuts narrative connectedness as well. If this offloading 
procedure does undermine narrative connectedness, then it also undermines personhood on the 
narrative view of identity. One might deny, however, that narrative connectedness necessitates 
intellectual autonomy. Perhaps partially offloading narrative structure to external artifacts can 
strengthen narrative connectedness in a similar way that partially offloading biological memory can 
strengthen psychological connectedness. Recall that narrative connectedness exists when a subject is 
able to provide a narrative explanation of the chronology of their lives and experiences. One might 
argue that external artifacts can assist subjects in providing this narrative explanation and that it does 
not matter whether or not the subject is personally responsible for constructing the narrative 
explanation.  
VII. Caveats 
Now let us ask: could the enhancements of the future, such as brain chips, be constructed to 
maintain continuity or narrative structure? If the psychological theory of personal identity is correct, 
and if technologies like brain chips can be made to preserve psychological properties like memories 
and personality traits, then it seems as if more radical enhancements also have the potential to 
preserve/bolster personal identity in the manner described in the previous section. It may even be 
possible to design a chip that preserves narrative structure.  
We must proceed carefully though. First, it is not clear if chips would preserve consciousness, when 
used in parts of the brain that are part of the neural basis of conscious experience. If someone 
replaces these parts, important psychological properties (experiential properties) would be lacking. It 
would be dubious to see the future zombie as a person or having a mind, let alone the same person 
as before. Second, we’ve indicated that psychological views are controversial. In particular, they face 
“reduplication problems”—problems involving thought experiments in which one’s pattern, 
narrative or psychological configuration is copied so precisely that, by the light of the psychological 
views, there seems to be two or more instances of the same individual at the same time.35  
 
35 See Parfit 1984, Sider 2001, Olson 2007, and Schneider 2019a.  
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Third, brain chips and other more radical forms of enhancement may raise concerns related to 
authenticity that milder forms of enhancement lack. Imagine a brain chip that enables you to not 
only unearth memories that would have otherwise been forgotten but also consciously access many 
more memories over a given time interval than you would have been able to without the chip. One 
concern about such a chip is that it may incentivize people to not be mindful and to instead “live in 
the past.” Insofar as authenticity is connected with mindfulness (as existentialists like Sartre claim), 
such a chip will function to make people less authentic. This worry, to be sure, also exists in the case 
of external artifacts but is magnified in the case of brain chips that directly affect cognition.  
Another “authenticity” related worry concerns the possibility that radical enhancements will 
augment psychological suffering. While neural prosthetics which raise our IQ levels or make us 
faster thinkers have obvious benefits, they may also function to amplify the “cognitive noise” which 
is responsible for the majority of psychological suffering within our species. Put differently, if the 
Buddhists are on the right track in claiming that all suffering is born out of thinking, then it is 
plausible that making us faster or better thinkers via brain chips will increase psychological suffering 
by and large (as opposed to leading to enlightenment and wisdom). Of course, particular kinds of 
brain chips, like the Zen Garden chip mentioned previously, might be immune to these worries 
concerning mindfulness and suffering.  
Fourth, consider that, from the vantage point of the brain view, if you have these chips, and they 
replace parts of the biological brain, there will be a point at which the biological brain is so 
diminished that instead of ensuring continuity over time, you would inadvertently end your life. 
Bearing in mind our stance of metaphysical humility, it would be unwise to rule out the possibility 
that the mind is the brain, for the brain is responsible for human cognitive and perceptual 
processing, making this position quite plausible. This leads us to suggest the following: Don’t offload 
parts of the biological brain, insofar as you suspect that the brain view may be correct.  
Even if AI is capable of underlying conscious experience, AI-based enhancements, if used, should 
supplement the workings of intact brain tissue, not destroy it and offload its activities to the cloud or 
another AI device. Biological therapies could instead be utilized to extend the life of the biological 
brain, or AI components could supplement activities of the brain, without replacing tissue. (Bearing 
in mind the earlier caveat that too radical of enhancements of these latter sorts may still be 
incompatible with survival over time, depending upon what one’s essential properties are.)  
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VIII. Conclusion: A Humble Approach  
It would be optimal if we could provide you with a clear, uncontroversial path to guide you through 
the brain enhancement decisions. Instead our message today has been: As we consider enhancement 
decisions, we must do so, first and foremost, with a mindset of metaphysical humility. Remember 
how controversial the different theories of personal identity are.  
Still, we have offered several provisional recommendations. We proposed that in making 
enhancement decisions, it is important to distinguish the issue of personal identity from that of 
consciousness. We also suggested that future consumers considering such enhancements be 
educated about the personal identity debates, as well as medical risks. In addition, we outlined 
various ways in which enhancements may be capable of preserving person- hood if a psychological 
view is correct. Enhancements, in particular, may be able to strengthen relations of psychological 
continuity and perhaps even narrative structure. This assumes the controversial view that a 
psychological theory of personal identity is correct, however. Further, if the brain theory is correct, 
these enhancements may be problematic, if they involve replacing parts of the brain. In light of this 
and bearing in mind the discussion of metaphysical humble approach, we believe it is most sensible 
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